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Lanni, Adriaan. Law and Order in Ancient Athens. New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2016. xii + 226 pp. Hardcover. USD 110.00.
Daily we hear in the media about protest movements in various places. Our
times are days of political and social unrest. For a long time, we have imagined
that the modern world is historically the most developed and well-ordered.
We have looked back and down upon former ages as primitive. Faced with
present tensions, it may be of value to revisit some of the ancient cultures.
In recent years we have seen a major rethinking of law and order in ancient
societies. It has become clear that the ancient world was not governed by a
prescriptive understanding of law. Adriaan Lanni’s Law and Order in Ancient
Athens is one more volume adding to this new perspective.
As Lanni describes, the book is about the puzzle and paradox that Ancient
Athens had limited formal coercive apparatus, no professional police or
public prosecutor, and legal processes depended almost entirely upon private
initiative. Even when an opponent was convicted to pay compensation, for
instance, there was no official agency ensuring that this actually happened.
Ancient Athens did not have “a rule of law” in the sense of court sanctions
being based upon predictable, consistent, and written statutes. Still, ancient
Athens was a “remarkably peaceful and well-ordered society by both ancient
and contemporary standards” (1).
Lanni argues convincingly that neither informal controls—such as social
sanctions (ridicule, shunning), internalized norms, self-help when a victim
of crime, and private discipline of women, minors, and slaves, nor formal
imposition of sanctions—such as those ruled by the courts, can adequately
explain the order upheld, for the most part, in ancient Athens. The irony
is that “the aspects of the Athenian legal system that seem to us the most
removed from a ‘rule of law’ may actually have been the most effective in
fostering order and compliance with norms” (200; cf. also 119).
According to the research presented by Lanni, the ancient Athens had
inbuilt mechanisms to guarantee compliance with norms through a dynamic
relation between informal and formal controls. Ancient Athens was a culture
of honor and shame. What was considered acceptable and respectable therefore set the standard of conduct. In legal cases, disputants would regularly cite
other laws than those directly applicable to the present case. In this way, the
populace was constantly reminded of the norms and laws of society. Further,
courts were neither bound by statutes or legal precedents, but would make a
democratic verdict in the face of the present dispute and circumstances. Given
the publicity of court cases, this would contribute to publicizing the present
norms and values of the city, even when they might deviate from written
laws. In court cases, character descriptions of oneself or one’s opponent were
frequent and taken into consideration, even when these character descriptions
were not directly relevant to the case in dispute. Knowing that one’s conduct,
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whatever it may have been, could be publicized in court, even in unrelated
disputes, would have a deterrent role compensating for the underenforcement
through formal sanctions.
Our own assumptions and preconceptions can often be a challenge in the
study of ancient cultures. Written sources that for an ancient mind would be
meaningful and self-evident given their context, may easily be misinterpreted
and misunderstood from our perspective. This is the challenge we often face
in the study of ancient manuscripts. Lanni’s discussion often needs to rest on
indirect evidence and indications. At certain points one could desire more
explicit and broader support for the conclusions. Her work is therefore likely
not the last word in the discussion. Still, she should be commended for being
able to present a consistent picture of how ancient Athens could be so peaceful and well-ordered, given the relative absence of the formal enforcement
that we, as moderns, tend to consider necessary for maintaining social order.
For biblical studies, I find Lanni’s book to be of special interest. In
OT studies, the legislative understanding of Torah has recently come under
scrutiny. It appears difficult to continue to uphold the traditional view that
ancient Israel was controlled by a “rule of law” as we think of it in modern
terms. In NT studies as well, a legalistic interpretation of the rabbis and Pharisees has been challenged more recently. The question, then, is how ancient
Israel maintained peace and order if they did not perceive Torah as we do our
modern constitutions and laws. Even if the judges should be instructed in
Torah (Exod 18:19–23), the function of Torah in the ancient Israelite court
appears to have worked differently than in modern jurisprudence. This is
something about which several scholars have written extensively and needs
not be repeated here. Lanni’s contribution to this debate is to show how,
in ancient Athens, law functioned and order was upheld differently than in
modern societies. Her study resonates in many ways with finds from other
cultures of the ancient Near East (ANE).
We can mention three parallels to the biblical material. First, “Athenian
statutes were notoriously vague. As a result, many statutes did not provide
much guidance about how to conform one’s conduct to the law” (56). As
biblical scholars, we can recognize parallels to this description in the nature
of the Torah. Torah, as other ANE laws, is not as comprehensive as we find
that our modern laws need to be. While Torah sanctions deviations from
marriage norms, it never, for example, regulates what constitutes the institution of marriage as such. At least from our modern perspective, many of the
moral and cultic instructions appear vague and underdefined. Second, “Plato,
at least, was aware of the expressive power of law and attempted to harness
this power in his model constitution, the Laws. He argues that it is better to
use law to persuade citizens to obey, making direct sanctions unnecessary”
(85). Also, in Torah we find an emphasis upon the public reading of Torah
(Exod 24:7; Deut 31:9–11; Josh 8:30–35; Neh 8:1–18; 2 Kgs 23:1–3; Luke
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4:14–34; Acts 13:15, 15:21, 17:2; 1 Tim 4:13) as well as the need to internalize its instructions (e.g., Deut 6:6–9, 11:18–21), all this in order to act
upon the basis of conviction rather than coercion. Finally, Lanni argues that,
even if the ancient Athenian “courts did not predictably and reliably enforce
statutes,” still “these laws had a symbolic force that operated as a significant
influence on everyday behavior” (118). Again, we find a parallel to ancient
Israel, where the ideal was to have the law written on one’s heart rather than
being enforced by social control.
In this way, I find Lanni’s book instructive for biblical studies on how
Torah might have functioned in ancient Israel, as well as giving us a fascinating glimpse into ancient Athens. In addition, while our modern cultures are
very different, they nevertheless draw from both ancient Israel and Athens.
Therefore, it may be very instructive to reflect on how these societies sought
to maintain peace and order differently than we do.
Vesterålen, Norway

Kenneth Bergland
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The Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism was put together to promote
discussion on the nature of humans and their mental states—specifically
views under the umbrella of substance dualism in a broad sense as well as
critiques of these views from a variety of perspectives. The open intent of
its organizers is “to construct a level playing ground of debate for all of the
various positions and their critics” (1). The work was edited by Jonathan J.
Loose (senior lecturer in philosophy and psychology at Heythrop College,
University of London), Angus J. L. Menuge (professor of philosophy at Concordia University Wisconsin and president of the Evangelical Philosophical
Society), and J. P. Moreland (professor of philosophy at Talbot School of
Theology, Biola University).
The volume contains thirty-two articles written by twenty-nine contributors. After two introductory articles, the remaining ones are organized into
three parts: first, “Articulating Substance Dualism”; second, “Alternatives
to Substance Dualism,” and, third, “Substance Dualism, Theology, and the
Bible.” Each of these parts is further divided into subsections, each containing
two or three articles that debate a given topic from different perspectives so
as to allow readers to “decide for themselves where the better arguments lie”
(1). In part one, the debates are on emergent dualism, Thomistic dualism,
Cartesian dualism, the unity of consciousness, and near-death experiences. In
part two, authors debate animalism, nonreductive physicalism, constitution-

